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Resumen
Estos comentarios examinan las instituciones democráticas 
transnacionales que, en un artículo publicado en este mismo volu-
men de la RLFP, Osvaldo Guariglia defiende como forma de limitar 
a los dos grupos oligárquicos que amenazan a las democracias con-
temporáneas. Este examen plantea dudas sobre dos aspectos de esa 
defensa. En primer lugar, sobre su fundamento conceptual –el dere-
cho humano a la democracia– y, en segundo lugar, sobre su carácter 
democrático, especialmente cuando es evaluada desde una perspec-
tiva de democracia radical.
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AbstRAct
These comments analyze the transnational democratic institu-
tions that, in an article published in this volume of RLFP, Guari-
glia defends as a limit to the two oligarchic groups that menace the 
contemporary democracies. This analysis raises doubts concerning 
two features of Guariglia’s defense. First, it questions his conceptual 
foundations –the human right to democracy– and, second, it ques-
tions its democratic nature, which is problematic when it is assessed 
from the viewpoint of radical democrat views. 
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In an article published in this volume of RLFP, Osvaldo 
Guariglia begins with an acute diagnosis of the threats to 
democracy posed by two oligarchic groups. On the one hand, 
decentralized economic groups which have the immediate 
capacity to endanger the stability of the policies chosen from 
a democratic government. On the other hand, populist sectors 
and political parties which combine political realism, dogma-
tism and a direct and confessional relation between the Lea-
der and the masses, in order to destroy the checks and balan-
ces that limit the permanent accumulation of power.
Facing this dismal diagnosis, Guariglia proposes that “the 
cure for democracy is more democracy”. I agree with that. 
However, I have some doubts that I would like to explore here 
concerning this solution. First, I will analyze if the solution is 
duly justified and second I will explore if that solution is really 
democratic. 
Concerning the conceptual issues, the argument is mainly 
supported on the existence of a human right to democracy. 
That human right is, according to the author, more deman-
ding and more enforceable in societies which already have a 
democratic constitution. The reasons for the validity of this 
human right are elements contained in the articles 1, 19 and 
21 of the Declaration of Human Rights enacted by United 
Nations and in a growing tendency to defend the priority of 
the International Law over the domestic law.
Nevertheless, the issue is not so simple. The immediate 
question after this argument is how this priority is justified. 
Guariglia would not be able to answer to this question by clai-
ming that International Law affirms a set of rights which bet-
ter protects human rights as this would be question begging. I 
think that Guariglia would argue, instead, that a human right 
to democracy is a precondition for assuring human rights in 
general. If this is his more fundamental argument, he would 
confer a privileged status to the human right to democracy 
but that would have to be more fully justified.
Another conceptual doubt arises from the distinction posed 
by Joshua Cohen between the right to democracy as an ele-
ment of a just society and a right to democracy as a human 
right. If this distinction is plausible, which I think it is, I 
would like to ask what difference this premise makes in terms 
of his argument. In other words, my question is: how could 
Guariglia defend democracy as a solution to the two oligarchic 
menaces mentioned without endorsing Cohen’s view? 
If Guariglia followed Cohen´s strategy, he could not defend 
the solution he opposes to the attack of economic and populist 
oligarchies and his diagnosis would be even more obscure. The 
solution that the author argues for is to create transnational 
democratic institutions, proposed initially for regional blocs 
such as Mercosur, Unasur, the European Community, and so 
on, that should not become mere business clubs and political 
leaders assemblies but remain bounded to common deliberati-
ve spaces and civic participation.
The human right to democracy premise seems to be neces-
sary in order to exert democratic control on these transnatio-
nal institutions which should also be responsive to the citizens´ 
claims. In other words, if the human right to democracy did not 
exist, these transnational institutions would neither need to 
be responsive to democratic inputs nor to their democratically 
elected leaders. The explicit problem with this is that even if 
the limitation to oligarchic powers were one of the main public 
and explicit goals of these institutions, nothing would assure 
that that goal would be achieved without an extensive politi-
cal participation and especially without a genuine interest in 
deliberative interaction. I think this argument that Guariglia 
could potentially formulate is interesting but at the same time 
it sounds too instrumental. So, his foundation of the human 
right to democracy seems to be incomplete. 
In respect to the democratic character of Guariglia’s propo-
sal, I would like to explore now some tensions in it, but let me 
first use a real example of a transnational institution. Let us 
consider, for instance, the newest transnational institution in 
Latin America which Guariglia generously qualifies as empty: 
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Unasur. The 14th article of its Constitutive Treaty states: “Poli-
tical consultation and coordination among the Member States 
of UNASUR will be based on harmony and mutual respect, 
strengthening regional stability and supporting the preserva-
tion of democratic values and the promotion of human rights.”
As we all know, one of leaders and founders of Unasur, 
Venezuela, has recently initiated the process of withdrawal 
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, one of the 
institutions that had more ample and beneficial effects in the 
history of the fight against the bloodiest dictatorships in the 
continent and the effective exercise of human rights. No criti-
cal public declarations have been made so far regarding this 
issue, neither by Unasur itself, nor by the Member States or 
their presidents.
This constitutes, then, an example of a transnational ins-
titution which publicly recognizes human rights as well as 
democratic values but in practice allows a state member to 
free itself from an important and recognized instrument for 
the effective and transnational protection of human rights. 
No doubt, we have to be prudent on this evaluation: Unasur 
is a rising institution with little influence and political impact 
except for some political declarations and for the expulsion 
of Paraguay after the unfair and speed trial to ex-president 
Lugo. Venezuela’s decision can still be reversed and we still 
do not know if it is not just a way of putting political pressure 
on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights rather than a 
move to free the country from its surveillance. 
Guariglia could obviously say that this example confirms 
his argument: when transnational institutions are not res-
ponsive to open and egalitarian deliberations from citizens-
hip, they are free to interpret the protection and promotion of 
human rights in any way they want, even if these are clearly 
opposed to a real protection. 
However, an important tension arises in this argument and 
I would like to explore it in some depth. Guariglia firmly belie-
ves in the republican principle of separation of powers as a 
way to limit the accumulation of power. Thus, answering to 
the factual existence of huge and concentrated powers –the 
populist leader who formally or informally concentrates full 
public and economic power– Guariglia believes that the crea-
tion of new political agents is enough to control these powers. 
Since most traditional nation-states are incapable of perfor-
ming this task, these new agents should have enough power 
and should also be transnational. 
The problem illustrated by the UNASUR affair is, never-
theless, that the creation of transnational entities is not 
sufficient to defend a plural, fair and deliberatively arranged 
domestic democracy, nor to build a transnational communica-
tive power developed from deliberative and inclusive proces-
ses or to secure the fulfillment of human rights. 
If this is so, the creation of these new transnational ins-
titutions may entail serous risks. The reason for this is that 
the creation of these bureaucratic-political authorities may 
interpose even larger barriers to citizen inputs. It is known 
that as long as political power concentrates in an institution, 
an egalitarian distribution of power decreases; bigger insti-
tutions amount to a decrease in democratic control. Is it not 
this the field for populist leaders who pretend to speak in the 
name of those excluded from institutions? Isn’t it the same 
risk foreseen by Kant when he condemned a world govern-
ment as necessarily despotic? In other words, I think this 
solution to the menaces to democracy rightly identified by 
Guariglia may show clear deficits in terms of democratic con-
trol. In view of these considerations, let me ask: Who would 
be in charge of controlling and monitoring these transnatio-
nal institutions?
Although Guariglia acknowledges that these institutions 
should be responsive enough to the claims of citizens and to 
their interests and that they should create the conditions 
to the generation of a communicative transnational power, 
his main solution is essentially institutional. But he never 
explains how to build more powerful channels of interaction 
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between citizens and these institutions and how to empower 
citizens.
Perhaps Guariglia could reply to this worry in the following 
way: it is much more realistic to build new transnational insti-
tutions than to build, maintain and be confident in the correct 
functioning of spread transnational channels for communica-
tive power. It is much more realistic to create new institutions 
than to change the citizens’ public practices. How could anyo-
ne, Guariglia may ask, realistically believe in the communica-
tive power of sincerely concerned citizens and in their capaci-
ty to control and limit the faceless corporative and economic 
power or the single, unique and dogmatic populist leader? Be 
this as it may, I would like to point out some radical democrat 
proposals which I am sympathetic to and then consider if they 
are compatible with Guariglia’s solution. 
James Bohman distinguishes two kinds of reactions to 
hyper-globalized societies (2007: 19-57). The first, named gra-
dualist, seeks the creation of institutions analogous to nation-
states and attempts to give them sufficient power to enfor-
ce the required laws. In last stance, gradualists pretend to 
expand the demos constitutive of democracy. The second, dee-
med transformationalist, sees the challenges posed by demo-
cracy as requiring a deeper and structural transformation of 
democracy, one which includes replacing the political subject 
of demos for the more decentralized and transnational demoi.
James Bohman rejects gradualist proposals –I think Boh-
man would include Guariglia’s proposals within this class of 
conceptions– on the basis that a deep social, structural and 
cultural modification in the nature of the public sphere is 
taking place. This modification in terms of the public sphere 
allows new forms of publicity and the transnationalization of 
communicative and deliberative power. While in the past the 
public sphere was defined by national frontiers, now multiple 
public and decentralized spaces seem to exist. This decentrali-
zed public spheres are not unified by a nation but agents who 
engage in reflexive and democratic activity; in being respon-
sive to others, participants must first actively constitute and 
maintain it as a public sphere. Bohman’s fundamental claim is 
that these transnational demoi should have enough capacity 
to include subjects and concerns in the international political 
agenda or –according to the conception defended by Dryzek- 
to contest decisions the decisions of transnational institutions, 
such as European Community and World Trade Organization 
(Dryzek 2005, 2006). In short, although this radical democrat 
solution may allow and promote vigorous interactions among 
new transnational demoi and formal institutions, Guariglia 
does not take this solution into account unless it is mediated 
by his preferred transnational institutions. 
In the same spirit, Regina Kreide (2012: 25-6) gives more 
concrete steps in the specification of this kind of radical and 
transnational democracy, arguing that the mere concept of 
popular sovereignty should be redefined to include effecti-
vely all the affected by a decision taken by transnational and 
international organisms and, at the same time, avoid its con-
finement to national borders. I just mention the three reforms 
proposed by Kreide: to increase the formal participation of 
citizens in international organizations in order to convert 
them into effectively representative organizations; to promote 
institutional efforts to force institutions acting at the inter-
national level (such as the WTO and the NATO) to be res-
ponsive to democratic decisions taken by nation-states; and, 
lastly, to transnationally expand the existing legal guarantees 
of rights, through which the equality of the deliberating part-
ners can be achieved independently of economic and political 
bargaining power.
Given this very basic reconstruction of the radical approach, I 
would now like to explore its compatibility with Guariglia’s pro-
posal. Let me first distinguish among several radical democra-
tic positions. A demanding radical democratic position would 
defend a strong connection between formal institutions and 
informal spheres of communicative power. To this end it could, 
for example, demand an equal vote for every affected citizen 
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in decisions taken by transnational institutions, or demand 
effective and egalitarian participation of every affected per-
son in the deliberative transnational forums, or demand that 
the leaders of transnational institutions (WTO, NATO, WHO, 
etc.) be elected by every citizen in the world. Another radical 
–albeit weaker– democrat proposal would require connecting 
formal institutions and informal spheres of communication by 
demanding a more direct interaction between citizens, groups 
of interests, etc., and transnational institutions, and a more 
inclusive and plural input to take political decisions. This pro-
posal is weaker in so far as it preserves the actual priority 
of transnational institutions over informal publics; transna-
tional institutions and public transnational spheres remain 
different, the former not limiting the latter. 
Would any of these radical democratic strategies be compa-
tible with Guariglia’s proposal? I think that, given his concerns 
regarding populism, he would find the demanding position too 
dangerous. After all, what would preserve these transnational 
institutions from the menaces registered in domestic politics? 
If this reasoning is correct, then Guariglia should be explicit 
about which sense of the polysemous term “democracy” he is 
using. 
In conclusion, unless Guariglia provides an additional 
argument to reject the stronger radical position, it is doubt-
ful that his transnational position could achieve the desired 
balance between oligarchic and populist menaces. On one 
side, if real participation from citizens is not secured in that 
transnational institutions, nothing prevents the creation of a 
new transnational oligarchy, different but oligarchic at last. 
On the other side, if that transnational institutions are not 
responsive to democratic input, new fields for populist claims 
are built. 
In this comment, I have made two main points. First, I rai-
sed some doubts about the justification of the human right to 
democracy and how Guariglia used it to defend transnatio-
nal institutions. Second, I have proven that the transnational 
solution proposed by Guariglia in response to oligarchic and 
populist menaces could be criticized by a demanding radical 
democrat position. 
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